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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Fourth Amendment - War-
rantless Search of Any Container Found in Automobile Held
Permissible. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
On June 1, 1982, the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered the most important search and seizure decision of the
last Term in United States v. Ross. I In Ross, the Court held
six to three2 that warrantless searches of closed containers
found within automobiles are not unreasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.3 After considering the
fourth amendment in its historical context,4 the Court held
that the only prerequisite to such a search was a determina-
tion of probable cause by the officer conducting the search.5
Once probable cause is found to exist, such searches could
be "as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant
'particularly describing the place to be searched.' 6
I. THE DECISION
In 1978 two District of Columbia police officers, acting
pursuant to an informant's tip, stopped an automobile
driven by Albert Ross.7 The informant had previously indi-
1. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). See Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expec-
tations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 557, 557 (1982) (where it was
stated that Ross was the most important fourth amendment case of the year).
2. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justices White,
Marshall and Brennan dissented.
3. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a discussion of the fourth
amendment as applied to various incidents of search and seizure, see generally W. LA
FAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASsoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 2162-64.
5. Id. at 2172.
6. Id. at 2154.
7. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982).
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cated to the officers that a man known as "Bandit" was dis-
tributing narcotics from the trunk of his car.8 Because Ross
fit the informant's physical description of "Bandit" and a
computer check indicated that Ross had used the alias "Ban-
dit," the officers ordered Ross out of the vehicle.9 While
conducting a search of Ross' person, one of the officers dis-
covered a bullet on the car's front seat. This officer then
searched the interior of the car and found a pistol in the
glove compartment. 10 After Ross' arrest for possession of
that pistol, a search of the car's trunk was conducted at the
Washington, D.C., Police Station. This search produced a
closed "lunch-type" brown paper bag and a zippered red
leather pouch." When these containers were opened, the
bag was found to contain narcotics and the leather pouch
was found to contain $3,200 in cash. No search warrant was
obtained prior to any of these searches. 12 Over Ross' objec-
tion, this evidence was admitted at his trial. He was subse-
quently convicted of possession of heroin with intent to
distribute. 13 The conviction was reversed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on the
grounds that the officers should not have opened and
searched either the paper bag or the leather pouch absent an
authorizing warrant.' 4
The United States Supreme Court granted the govern-
ment's petition for certiorari to clarify the law involving war-






13. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976).
14. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rep'd, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982). Actually, there were two court of appeals cases. First, a three judge
panel of the court of appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the officers'
warrantless search of the leather pouch violated Ross' fourth amendment right to
privacy. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980). However, the
like search of the paper bag was found permissible because the nature of such a
container could not reasonably support an expectation of privacy. Ross, No. 79-1624,
slip op. at 14-15. The entire court of appeals voted to rehear the case en banc. The
court then ruled that such a distinction between containers was without merit and
thus, neither the bag nor the pouch could be properly searched without a warrant.
655 F.2d at 1161.
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previous holding in Robbins v. California.1 5 The Robbins
holding was that while closed luggage found in automobiles
could not be searched without a warrant, less substantial
containers could be.1 6 After noting that the fourth amend-
ment, viewed in an historical perspective, has long been con-
strued as differentiating between fixed dwellings and
movable vehicles, the Court reaffirmed that warrantless
searches of automobiles are permissible.1 7
The Court then turned to the central issue regarding the
validity of warrantless searches of closed containers found
within automobiles. The Court distinguished prior cases
that held such searches constitutionally impermissible 18 and
concluded that such searches are in fact proper.1 9 In so de-
ciding, the Court expressed concern that a "contrary rule
could produce absurd results inconsistent with the rationale
which permits warrantless searches of automobiles. ' 20 The
Court also recognized that if closed containers were not
searchable along with the automobiles in which they were
carried, the practical law enforcement benefits derived from
the ability to search an automobile without a warrant would
be nullified.21 The Court stated that "[c]ontraband goods
rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by
their very nature such goods must be withheld from public
view, they rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they
are enclosed within some form of container. '22 Thus, it was
concluded, such a search could be as broad in scope as a like
search conducted pursuant to a warrant.23
15. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion). See infra notes 61-68 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Robbins.
16. 453 U.S. at 428-29.
17. 102 S. Ct. at 2163.
18. The Court indicated that:
[u]nlke Chadwick and Sanders, in this case [Ross] police officers had probable
cause to search respondent's entire vehicle. Unlike Robbins, in this case the
parties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the course of a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile, police are entitled to open contain-
ers found within the vehicle.
Id. at 2168.
19. Id. at 2172.
20. Id. at 2169.
21. Id. at 2170.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 6.
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II. BACKGROUND
In Ross the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue
of whether it was permissible to search closed containers
found within automobiles during warrantless searches of
those automobiles. In order to understand the analysis of
the Court in Ross, it is necessary to understand the history of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion24 basically provides that searches of private property by
government officials are improper unless conducted pursu-
ant to a warrant issued by a magistrate based upon probable
cause.25 It is reasoned that the warrant requirement reflects
the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms
will best be preserved through a separation of powers and
division of functions among the different branches and levels
of Government." 26
There have been judicially created exceptions to this gen-
eral requirement of a warrant. These exceptions are said to
be necessary to "provide for those cases where the societal
costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or
the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the rea-
sons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate." 27 Just such
an exception was created for the automobile in Carroll v.
United States.28
When the Court decided Carroll, it added another to
what has become a growing list of exceptions to the warrant
requirement.29 In Carroll the Court was confronted with a
24. See supra note 3.
25. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979). There the Court stated that it
had "interpreted the Amendment to include the requirement that normally searches
of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant ... " Id. For a
discussion of probable cause see infra note 35.
26. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,317 (1972). See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
27. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
28. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Moylan, The Automobile Exception What It Is and
What It Is Not -4 Rationale in Search f a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987
(1976). Judge Moylan defines the automobile exception as the "legitimate search of a
constitutionally protected area whenever (1) probable cause to believe that that area
contains evidence of crime conjoins with (2) an exigency arising out of the mobility
and imminent disappearance of that very constitutionally protected area itself."
Moylan, supra, at 987.
29. When Carroll was decided in 1925, it became the second oldest of the warrant
clause exceptions, the oldest exception being that of the warrantless search incident to
[Vol. 66:161
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situation in which federal agents had stopped an automobile
and, without a search warrant, torn open the rumble seat
and discovered illicit whiskey.30 The Court analyzed the
fourth amendment in an historical context:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the government, as recog-
nizing a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile for con-
traband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a war-
rant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.31
The Court indicated that such searches are only permissible
when the searching officer has probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband.3 2 Thus, if an officer had prob-
able cause to believe an automobile carried contraband and
if due to that automobile's mobility, the obtaining of a
search warrant was not feasible, the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement was said to exist and a search could
be immediately conducted. 3
a lawful arrest. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). For subsequent
exceptions see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (plain view); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent). See
also Moylan, supra note 28, at 988.
30. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-35 (1925).
31. Id. at 153. See also Moylan, supra note 28.
32. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). For a definition of prob-
able cause see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
33. See Moylan, supra note 28, at 992-93, for a discussion of these two require-
ments. See also Robb, The Carroll Case: The Expansion of the Automobile Exception
in Warrantless Search and Seizure Cases, 15 WILLAMETrE L.J. 39 (1978). Robb offers
a slightly different theory for the Carroll decision:
The holding was based on two propositions: (1) the inherent mobility of the
automobile rendered the acquisition of a search warrant impracticable; and
(2) it would have circumvented the intent of the National Prohibition Act to
reach and destroy forbidden liquor in transport, to require a search warrant
under the circumstances there presented.
Id. at 41.
Robb further indicates that "[bly accenting the need to enforce Prohibition, the
Carroll majority had, in effect, claimed that the greater harm to the nation would
1982]
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During the period immediately following the Carroll de-
cision, other warrantless searches of motorized vehicles were
held constitutional. The most significant of these decisions
was Brinegar v. United States.3 4 Brinegar is important for
the insight it provides regarding the standard by which prob-
able cause is to be judged. The Brinegar Court set forth cri-
teria against which a given factual situation was to be
measured in order to determine probable cause:
Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean
more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where
"the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed."
Thus, with the Carroll and Brinegar decisions the Court had
firmly established the automobile exception to the general
warrant requirement.
As the automobile exception was applied to a greater
number of warrantless searches, the scope of the exception
began to expand. The most significant case contributing to
this expansion was Chambers v. Maroney.36 In Chambers
the Court modified the need for "mobility" or "exigency"
previously required by Carroll.37 In Chambers a warrantless
search of an automobile was conducted at a police station
when there was no possibility of the disappearance or de-
result from circumventing the eighteenth amendment than by allowing governmental
violation of the warrant requirement." Id. at 41 n.17.
34. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
35. Id. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 167 (1925)). See
Robb, supra note 33, at 50-53, in which he postulated that the Court has never specifi-
cally addressed the quantum and quality of factual circumstances necessary to sup-
port probable cause in warrantless automobile searches. He further stated that:
The Court's inattention to the definition of a clearer standard of probable
cause is perhaps consistent with its policy of giving officers the widest possible
latitude in conducting automobile searches. When it operates in conjunction
with the expanded "mobility" doctrine, however, a vague definition of prob-
able cause comes dangerously close, in many instances, to undermining the
basic fourth amendment policy of protecting citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Id. at 53.
36. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
37. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66:161
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struction of the seized contraband.38 The Court sanctioned
this search and indicated that depriving the occupants of the
use of the car until a warrant could be obtained may prove
to be a greater intrusion upon their constitutional rights than
an immediate warrantless search.39 If probable cause to
search is established, the Court decided that a warrant need
not be obtained prior to the search even though the automo-
bile itself is no longer mobile.4 °
Perhaps the situation in which the Court has encountered
the most difficulty is that involving the warrantless search of
closed containers found within automobiles. The first case
to squarely confront this issue was United States v. Chad-
wick.41 In that case, federal narcotic agents seized a foot-
locker resting in the open trunk of an automobile. The
footlocker was taken to the Federal Building in Boston
where it was stored so as to create "no risk that whatever was
contained in the footlocker trunk would be removed by the
defendants or their associates. 42 One hour and a half later,
the agents opened the locker without a warrant and discov-
ered marihuana.43
The government sought to justify this search under
Chambers.44 The government did not, however, attempt to
argue that the footlocker's brief contact with the automo-
bile's trunk created the automobile exception, but urged that
the "mobility" of a footlocker makes it analogous to motor
38. 399 U.S. at 44.
39. Id. at 51-52. Contra id. at 63-64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting),
where Justice Harlan stated:
[Ifn the circumstances in which this problem is likely to occur, the lesser intru-
sion will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period - per-
haps a day - necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search warrant. In
the first place, as this case shows, the very facts establishing probable cause to
search will often justify arrest of the occupants of the vehicle. Since the occu-
pants themselves are to be taken into custody, they will suffer minimal further
inconvenience from the temporary immobilization of their vehicle. Even
where no arrests are made, persons who wish to avoid a search - either to
protect their privacy or to conceal incriminating evidence - will almost cer-
tainly prefer a brief loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange for the opportu-
nity to have a magistrate pass upon the justification for the search.
40. Id. at 51-52.
41. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 5.
44. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
1982]
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vehicles for fourth amendment purposes.45 The Court re-
jected this argument indicating that the rationale permitting
warrantless searches of automobiles was inapplicable to like
searches of containers.4 6 Automobiles are subject to a war-
rantless search, according to the Court, because there exists a
diminished expectation of privacy in the automobile.47 The
Court concluded that this diminished expectation of privacy
does not apply to footlockers, stating that "[i]n sum, a per-
son's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are sub-
stantially greater than in an automobile. 48 The Chadwick
Court further reasoned that because the footlocker was
safely placed in the Federal Building, any claim that its in-
herent mobility required an immediate warrantless search
was without merit.49 Finding no justification for the war-
rantless search, the Court held that the search violated the
fourth amendment. °
The next case decided by the Court involving a warrant-
less search of a container was Arkansas v. Sanders.5' Sand-
ers presented a somewhat different factual situation from
Chadwick. In Sanders authorities stopped a taxi cab as it
drove away from an airport. 2 They seized a suitcase from
the trunk and immediately searched it, finding over nine
pounds of marihuana.53 The Court stated that because
Sanders presented a somewhat different situation from
Chadwick,54 it would have to determine whether the war-
rantless search of the suitcase fell on the Chadwick or the
Chambers/Carroll side of the fourth amendment.: 5
Unlike Chadwick, the government in Sanders attempted
to justify the search by bringing it directly within the scope
45. 433 U.S. at 12.
46. Id. at 13.
47. The Court stated that because the automobile travels public throughfares and
is subject to registration, licensing and safety inspections, its occupants necessarily
entertain a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 12-13.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 15.
51. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
52. Id. at 755.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 762-63.
55. Id., at 757.
[Vol. 66:161
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
of the automobile exception.5 6 The Court rejected this at-
tempt to distinguish Chadwick and decided that:
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as
mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in
Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the
point immediately before the search-after the police have
seized the object to be searched and have it securely within
their control.57
The Court indicated that once the police have seized a suit-
case, "the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the
place from which it was taken. ' 58 As to the question of ex-
pectation of privacy, the Sanders Court stated that "a suit-
case taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is
not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy
than is associated with luggage taken from other loca-
tions.159 The Court concluded that the warrantless search
was not justified, finding "no justification for the extension
of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of one's
personal luggage merely because it was located in an auto-
mobile lawfully stopped by the police. 60
In 1981 the Supreme Court, in Robbins v. California, ren-
dered an opinion regarding warrantless container searches.6'
The Robbins Court addressed the situation in which the
container searched was not personal luggage, but green
opaque plastic packages, each found to contain fifteen
pounds of marihuana.62 The Court looked to both Chad-
wick and Sanders and ruled that "[t]hose cases made it clear,
if it was not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage
found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected
to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found any-
where else."163 The government attempted to distinguish
those decisions by arguing that the nature of the container,
in this case, green opaque plastic, diminished the constitu-
56. Id. at 762.
57. Id. at 763.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 764.
60. Id. at 765.
61. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. at 425.
1982]
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tional protection to which it would otherwise be entitled.r4
The Court rejected this argument by ruling, first, that it had
no constitutional basis and, second, that such a distinction
would be impossible to administer in an objective manner.65
Following Chadwick and Sanders, the Robbins Court de-
cided that containers found within aitomobiles are not sub-
ject to warrantless searches as readily as the automobile
itself.66
One year later, the Court in Ross expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the holdings in Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins.
The Court indicated that neither Chadwick nor Sanders was
truly a case construing the automobile exception.67 More-
over, the parties in Robbins had not squarely raised the
question of "whether in the course of a legitimate warrant-
less search of an automobile, police are entitled to open con-
tainers found within the vehicle. '6  The Ross decision was
necessary to definitively set forth guidelines pertaining to
this issue.
III. THE Ross ANALYSIS
Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority in Ross, ex-
plained that an analysis of the law regarding warrantless
searches of containers found within automobiles must be
designed to resolve a fundamental conflict in society. This
conflict is that which arises "between the individual's consti-
tutionally protected interest in privacy and the public inter-
est in effective law enforcement. 69 When the Court set out
in Ross to resolve this conflict through its analysis of the law
regarding the automobile exception, rather than looking to
64. Id.
65. Id. at 426-27.
66. Id. at 428.
67. The Court explained that neither Chadwick nor Sanders was an automobile
case "because the police there had probable cause to search the double-locked foot-
locker and the suitcase respectively before either came near an automobile." United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1982) (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 429 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)).
68. 102 S. Ct. at 2168. The Court concluded that "institutional constraints made
it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine without full adversary presentation."
Id.
69. Id. at 2161-62.
[Vol. 66:161
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the more contemporary decisions on the subject, it focused
instead on the fifty-seven year old Carroll decision.
The Court explained that Carroll indicated that an anal-
ysis of the law regarding the automobile exception must be-
gin with the history of the fourth amendment. The Court
felt that Carroll required "[t]he Fourth Amendment... to
be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasona-
ble search and seizure when it was adopted .... -7o The
Court then reaffirmed the Carroll Court's interpretation of
the warrant requirement. This interpretation construed the
requirement to apply differently to searches of fixed dwell-
ings than to searches of movable objects. 71 This construction
was largely the result of looking solely to the interpretation
given the fourth amendment at the time of its ratification.72
The Court explained that it was the "mobility" of these cer-
tain objects which made the securing of a warrant prior to
their search impracticable. The Court concluded that "[it is
this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that
provided the basis for the Carroll decision. 73
The Court in Ross noted that "impracticability" alone is
not sufficient to permit the warrantless search of an automo-
bile.74 In addition, it stated that "the Court in Carroll em-
phasized the importance of the requirement that officers
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains con-
70. Id. at 2162 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). But
see the majority opinion in Chadwick where Chief Justice Burger explained that look-
ing to the intent of the framers of the Constitution at the time of its ratification may
prove misleading. He indicated that although "the Framers were men who focused
on the wrongs of that day [they also] intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth."
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 2162.
72. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. But see Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion in Chadwick where he states:
[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended the Warrant Clause to
operate outside the home, there is no evidence at all that they intended to
exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the home.
The absence of a contemporary outcry against warrantless searches in public
places was because, aside from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless
searches were not a large issue in colonial America.
433 U.S. at 8.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 2163.
74. Id. at 2163-64.
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traband.' ' 75 The impracticability of securing a warrant prior
to the search of an automobile allows a search of that auto-
mobile to be deemed reasonable "if based on facts that
would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a war-
rant has not actually been obtained. 76 Thus, the Court reaf-
firmed Carroll and the Carroll criteria which made
impracticability and probable cause necessary to invoke the
automobile exception.
The Ross Court then turned its attention to the issue in-
volving warrantless searches of containers found within
automobiles during a Carroll search. The Court's analysis
of the law in this area was highlighted by its attempt to dist-
inguish Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins.7 The Court began
its analysis of these three cases by indicating in advance the
conclusion such an analysis would reach. The Court said
that "[t]he rationale justifying a warrantless search of an au-
tomobile that is believed to be transporting contraband ar-
guably applies with equal force to any movable container
that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance. 78
The Ross Court summarily stated the facts and holdings
of both Chadwick and Sanders.79 It then offered Chief Jus-
tice Burger's concurring opinion in Sanders as the correct
interpretation of these decisions. In that opinion, the Chief
Justice stated:
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported
by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile
in which it was being carried, that was the suspected locus
of the contraband. The relationship between the automo-
bile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in
Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was resting in the
trunk of the automobile at the time of respondent's arrest
does not turn this into an "automobile" exception case. °
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, offered further
support for the majority's view that' neither Chadwick nor
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2164.
77. See supra notes 67 & 68.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 2165.
79. Id. at 2165-66.
80. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 767 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (em-
phasis in original).
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Sanders involved application of the automobile exception
rule. Justice Powell opined in Robbins that Chadwick and
Sanders were not automobile cases "because the police there
had probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an au-
tomobile." ' Justice Powell concluded that neither Chad-
wick nor Sanders offered assistance to the resolution of the
issue addressed in Ross.
In attempting to distinguish Robbins from the situation
in Ross, the Court encountered greater difficulty. The Court
in Robbins clearly indicated that "a closed piece of luggage
found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected
to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found any-
where else.82 The Court explained that the holding in Rob-
bins may have been different had the parties therein
squarely addressed the question of whether closed contain-
ers found during a Carroll search could be opened and
searched pursuant to the automobile exception.8 3 This was
the extent of the Court's explanation as to why Robbins was
not controlling in Ross.
The Court, satisfied that it had adequately distinguished
Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins,84 turned to the issue
presented in Ross. Restating its prior assessment of the basis
of the automobile exception as set forth in Carroll, the Ross
Court explained that Carroll was "based on the Court's ap-
praisal of practical consideration viewed in the perspective
of history."85 This basis, according to the Court, would be
nullified if the warrantless search of an automobile could not
encompass containers found within.86 The Court reasoned
that Carroll merely relaxed the requirement of a warrant on
the ground of impracticability and found that Carroll
"neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search
based on probable cause. 87 The Court then held that "[t]he
scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no
81. See supra note 67.
82. See supra note 63.
83. See supra note 68.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 2168.
85. Id. at 2170.
86. See supra note 19.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
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narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search au-
thorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only
the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search
otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize. ' 88 The Court
concluded that a search properly conducted pursuant to the
automobile exception was, for all practical purposes, tanta-
mount to one conducted pursuant to a warrant. "If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it jus-
tifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search. 89
The Court in Ross clearly resolved the conflict between
the individual's constitutional interest in privacy and the so-
cietal interest in effective law enforcement in favor of effec-
tive law enforcement. Consequently, as a result of Ross, an
individual's privacy interest in containers placed within his
automobile is deemed outweighed by the societal interest in
effectively seizing contraband being transported along public
roadways.90 The Court clearly ruled that containers found
within an automobile during a lawful warrantless search are
also subject to a like search if there is probable cause to be-
lieve they contain contraband.9'
Justice Marshall vehemently took issue with the major-
ity's holding.92 He protested that the majority's newly cre-
ated "probable cause" exception to the warrant requirement,
aside from being unprecedented, totally ignores the function
that a magistrate plays in the warrant issuing process.93 The
dissent insisted that had this function been considered, the




92. Id. at 2173-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall was joined by Justice
Brennan. Justice White wrote a brief separate dissent. Id. at 2173 (White, J., dissent-
ing). However, Justice White agreed with the Marshall dissent. Id. at 2173.
93. Id. at 2173-74. See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), in
which the Court held:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.
333 U.S. at 13-14.
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majority could not have reasonably concluded that a search
of an automobile conducted without a magistrate's approval
could be as broad in scope as a search conducted with such
approval.94
Justice Marshall further challenged the majority to jus-
tify a container search pursuant to the automobile exception,
noting that containers, by their very nature, fail to meet the
exception's "mobility" requirement.95 Moreover, the dissent
pointed out, containers are attended by a greater expectation
of privacy than the automobile in which they are found.
96
Thus, the dissent argued, extending the automobile excep-
tion to cover closed containers found within vehicles defies
precedent. 97
IV. THE IMPACT OF ROSS
The Ross decision will serve to clarify the present
Supreme Court's position on the permissible scope of a war-
rantless automobile search. The Court clearly indicated that
the warrantless search of an automobile may be as broad in
scope as a like search conducted pursuant to a warrant. A
warrantless search of an automobile may properly include a
search of all containers found therein. The Court further
provided that the only prerequisite to such a search is that
the officer conducting the search have probable cause to be-
lieve he will uncover contraband.98 Courts in the future will
be able to confine their inquiry into the constitutionality of a
warrantless automobile search to a determination of the req-
uisite probable cause.
Aside from this clarification of the law regarding war-
rantless automobile searches, the decision may offer some in-
dication as to how the Court will rule on future occasions.
With the addition of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the
Court now seems to possess a solid pro-law-enforcement
94. 102 S. Ct. at 2174-75, 2176-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2175.
96. Id. at 2176.
97. Id. at 2181. Justice Marshall pointed out that "fthe Court today ignores the
clear distinction that Chadwick established between movable containers and
automobiles. It also rejects all of the relevant reasoning of Sanders and offers a
substitute rationale that appears inconsistent with the result." Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 2172.
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majority. Moreover, this majority seems unconcerned with
adhering to recent precedent. This is evidenced by the fact
that Ross rejects "the precise holding in Robbins,"" a deci-
sion rendered less than one year ago.
The Ross opinion is also demonstrative of a method of
legal analysis somewhat peculiar to the Burger Court. This
methodology involves a somewhat convoluted use of prece-
dent. Rather than looking to recent precedent for guidance
when addressing an issue, the Burger Court has exhibited a
propensity to base its opinions on cases decided many years
earlier.'00 The Ross Court bypassed recent automobile ex-
ception cases and based its decision on the fifty-seven year
old Carroll case.10I The use of this methodology is indica-
tive of a decision which is result oriented. The ignoring or
distinguishing of recent precedent in order to reach a desired
result can best be described as "outcome-determinative."
The use of this methodology also introduces an element
of confusion into the law by creating a real question as to the
precedential value of the cases bypassed by the Supreme
Court. This confusion may now have been introduced into
the area of law regarding warrantless automobile searches.
Consequently, a serious question as to the precedential value
of Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins is created by the Ross
Court's reliance on Carroll. Although the precise holding in
Ross seems relatively uncomplicated, courts in the future
will have to wrestle with this question when applying Ross to
specific situations.
This confusion may be aggravated by the manner in
which the Court used Carroll as precedent. While claiming
to base its decision directly on Carroll,0 2 the Court, in real-
ity, reached a conclusion in Ross inconsistent with the rule
set forth in Carroll. After the Ross Court specifically reaf-
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). In the Harris case,
the Court was confronted with the challenge of defining precisely the nature and
quantum of factual support needed for the proper issuance of a warrant by a magis-
trate. Id. at 576-77. In reaching its decision, the Court overlooked the more recently
decided cases on this issue, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and based its holding on Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960). Harris, 403 U.S. at 576-83.
101. 102 S. Ct. at 2162-64, 2169-72.
102. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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firmed the rule of Carroll,0 3 the majority determined that a
closed container found in an automobile could be subject to
a warrantless search pursuant to this ruleY°4 The inconsis-
tency of this holding is that a closed container, by its very
nature, fails to satisfy the "mobility" rationale supporting
the rule of Carroll. Thus, while claiming to specifically rely
on Carroll as a basis for its decision in Ross, the Court for-
mulated a rule which is inconsistent with the rationale used
by the Carroll Court to justify the warrantless search.
This apparent elimination of the "mobility" requirement
as a justification for the warrantless search is essentially
what was criticized by the dissent in Ross. 10 5 Once "mobil-
ity" is eliminated as an exigent circumstance justifying the
warrantless search, the only criterion remaining for con-
ducting such a search is probable cause. As asserted by Jus-
tice Marshall in his dissent, the true import of the Ross
decision may be that it authorizes a warrantless search
merely upon a showing of probable cause.10 6 This decision
may, therefore, be the first of many cases in which the exi-
gency element, previously needed to justify a warrantless
search, is eliminated. The dissent's contention that a "prob-
able cause" exception to the warrant requirement was cre-
ated in Ross may prove to be a correct assessment of this
decision's effect.'0 7
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103. 102 S. Ct. at 2164.
104. Id. at 2169-72.
105. Id. at 2173-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2174.
107. Id.
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